Option pricing in market models driven by telegraph processes with jumps

Esta tesis está dividida en dos partes: en la primera parte se presentan y estudian los procesos telegráficos, los procesos de Poisson con compensador telegráfico y los procesos telegráficos con saltos. El estudio presentado en esta primera parte incluye el cálculo de las distribuciones de cada proceso, las medias y varianzas, así como las funciones generadoras de momentos entre otras propiedades. Utilizando estas propiedades en la segunda parte se estudian los modelos de valoración de opciones basados en procesos telegráficos con saltos. En esta parte se da una descripción de cómo calcular las medidas neutrales al riesgo, se encuentra la condición de no arbitraje en este tipo de modelos y por último se calcula el precio de las opciones Europeas de compra y venta.

On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets

We consider two–sided many–to–many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may hire multiple workers. We study individual and group manipulations in centralized markets that employ (pairwise) stable mechanisms and that require participants to submit rank order lists of agents on the other side of the market. We are interested in simple preference manipulations that have been reported and studied in empirical and theoretical work: truncation strategies, which are the lists obtained by removing a tail of least preferred partners from a preference list, and the more general dropping strategies, which are the lists obtained by only removing partners from a preference list (i.e., no reshuffling). We study when truncation / dropping strategies are exhaustive for a group of agents on the same side of the market, i.e., when each match resulting from preference manipulations can be replicated or improved upon by some truncation / dropping strategies. We prove that for each stable mechanism, truncation strategies are exhaustive for each agent with quota 1 (Theorem 1). We show that this result cannot be extended neither to group manipulations (even when all quotas equal 1 – Example 1), nor to individual manipulations when the agent’s quota is larger than 1 (even when all other agents’ quotas equal 1 – Example 2). Finally, we prove that for each stable mechanism, dropping strategies are exhaustive for each group of agents on the same side of the market (Theorem 2), i.e., independently of the quotas.